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Reciprocity of social inﬂuence
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Humans seek advice, via social interaction, to improve their decisions. While social inter-
action is often reciprocal, the role of reciprocity in social inﬂuence is unknown. Here, we
tested the hypothesis that our inﬂuence on others affects how much we are inﬂuenced by
them. Participants ﬁrst made a visual perceptual estimate and then shared their estimate with
an alleged partner. Then, in alternating trials, the participant either revised their decisions
or observed how the partner revised theirs. We systematically manipulated the partner’s
susceptibility to inﬂuence from the participant. We show that participants reciprocated
inﬂuence with their partner by gravitating toward the susceptible (but not insusceptible)
partner’s opinion. In further experiments, we showed that reciprocity is both a dynamic
process and is abolished when people believed that they interacted with a computer.
Reciprocal social inﬂuence is a signaling medium for human-to-human communication that
goes beyond aggregation of evidence for decision improvement.
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When we are uncertain, we look for a second opinionand those opinions often change our decisions andpreferences1–5. Moreover, social inﬂuence is not
restricted to difﬁcult or critical decisions: evaluations of the
comments in the news media are affected by previous scores of
the content6 and risk preferences alter after observing other
people’s choices7. Social inﬂuence extends to perceptual judg-
ment8–10 and long-term memory11. Social information can help
improve decision accuracy12, outcome value13, and evaluative
judgment14–16. On the other hand, social inﬂuence can also lead
to catastrophic outcomes. Social inﬂuence causes information
cascades17 urging individuals to ignore their own accurate
information in favor of the cascaded falsehoods. In some cases,
groups are less biased when their individuals resist social
inﬂuence18. Social inﬂuence can undermine group diversity19
leading to disastrous phenomena such as market bubble20, rich-
get-richer dynamics21, and zealotry22.
Humans tend to reciprocate in social interaction23,24. We react
to respect with respect and hostility with hostility23. Smiling staff
get more tips25. Violators of trust in Trust Games26, and free
riders (i.e., those who do not contribute) in Public Good Games
are punished27. Since social inﬂuence is, by deﬁnition, mediated
via social interaction, one may wonder if reciprocity extends to
social inﬂuence itself. However, despite a wealth of research on
reciprocal behavior, to our knowledge, no study has examined the
existence of reciprocity in how we receive and inﬂict inﬂuence
on others28,29.
Several studies in social decision-making in humans have
shown a sensible correspondence between the reliability of social
information (e.g., advice) and the extent to which that advice is
assimilated in decisions and preferences. For example, human
agents integrate their own choice with that of an advisor by
optimally tracking the trustworthiness of the advisor30 and are
able to track the expertise of several agents concurrently31. Social
information is integrated into value and conﬁdence judgment
based on its reliability32 or credibility33. People can integrate
information from themselves and others based on their con-
ﬁdence9. These studies offer strong evidence for what previous
works in social psychology have called “informational con-
formity”34, which is based on the assumption that others can have
access to information that will help the agent achieve better
accuracy. The prediction drawn from this informational account
is that social inﬂuence should hinge on the reliability of the source
and quality of the advice but not on conventions and norms
such as reciprocity. If we could beneﬁt from others’ (critical)
opinion and the accuracy of our opinion is our only concern, then
we should welcome reliable advice irrespective of the advisor’s
attitude toward our opinion.
On the other hand, numerous studies indicate that
people perform less than ideally when using social
information10,35–37. When aggregating individual and social
information about a perceptual decision, humans follow a sim-
plifying heuristic, dubbed equality bias: the tendency to allow
everyone equal say in a collective decision irrespective of their
differential accuracy or expertise36,37. The universal prevalence of
the equality bias is important because it shows that even though
humans do have the cognitive and computational capacity
to track the trustworthiness30, reliability31, and credibility33 of
others, they still choose to employ a simple heuristic. Other
studies have shown that in a different set of experimental con-
ditions, people show an egocentric bias by relying on their own
individual information more than they should38,39. These
ﬁndings suggest that normative concerns such as equality and
maintaining a good self-image may also play an important role in
interactive decision-making. These factors are not consistent with
the Bayesian theory of social information aggregation30,32,33,
which requires that the inﬂuence that people take from others
should not depend on norms and conventions. An empirical
observation of reciprocity in advice-taking would be inconsistent
with the Bayesian theory of social inﬂuence30,32,33.
To summarize, aligning with other people’s choices by
taking their advice could be motivated informationally40 to
increase accuracy, or normatively41 to afﬁliate with others and
maintain positive self-esteem. Following other people’s advice
often leads to more accurate decisions9,42,43. Alignment can
contribute to a positive self-image44 and is used as a compensa-
tory tool among minorities45. Being ignored in a virtual game
can damage one’s self-image46. Social exclusion has negative
consequences on the excluded47. We hypothesized that people
would reciprocate inﬂuence with others because reciprocity is a
pervasive social norm48. If one breaks the norm of reciprocity,
one should expect to be punished49, for example, by being
ignored. Therefore, participants would reciprocate with a reci-
procating partner in order to maintain inﬂuence over them and
avoid the negative experience of losing inﬂuence47. On the other
hand, for a non-reciprocating partner who violates the norm,
participants may have a desire to punish the partner by ignoring
their opinion. We tested these hypotheses by investigating
if participants in a social decision-making task take less
advice from insusceptible partners, i.e., those who do not
take advice from the participant. Conversely, we also tested if
participants take more advice from susceptible partners, i.e., those
who are inﬂuenced by the participant’s suggestions.
We adopted and modiﬁed an experimental perceptual task
inspired by recent work on aggregation of social and individual
information10. Participants estimated the location of a visual
target on a computer screen. Then they saw the estimate of their
partner about the location of the same target. The participant did
not know that this partner’s opinion was, in reality, generated by
sampling randomly from a distribution centered on the correct
answer. After the two initial estimates were disclosed, the parti-
cipant or the partner was allowed to revise their estimate. An
algorithm generated the partner’s revised estimate simulating
susceptible or insusceptible partners. Experiment 1 showed that,
participants took more advice from the partner who took more
advice from the participant. Experiment 2A and 2B investigated
the dynamics of reciprocity and whether reciprocity depends
critically on whether we believe it changes the partner’s state of
mind. Participants thought they worked with either a human or
a computer partner and reciprocity disappeared when subjects
believed they were working with a computer partner. Finally,
our results also showed that reciprocity had a profound impact on
participants’ evaluation of their own performance, which was
lower when working with a non-reciprocating partner.
Results
Experiment 1. In experiment 1, 20 participants were recruited
one at a time and told that they would cooperate with three
partners who were participating in the same experiment simul-
taneously in other laboratory rooms connected via internet. In
reality, each participant was coupled with a computer algorithm.
The algorithm generated three distinct behavioral proﬁles, cor-
responding to three experimental conditions (see below), which
were administered in a block design in counterbalanced order.
Participants were not informed about this arrangement. In each
trial, the participant made a perceptual estimate about the loca-
tion of a target on the screen (Fig. 1). After stating her initial
estimate, the participant saw the opinion of the partner about the
same stimulus. Next, the participant either revised her estimate or
observed the partners revise theirs. Participants were required to
put their second estimate between their own ﬁrst estimate and
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that of their partner’s. The acceptable range included staying on
their ﬁrst estimate or moving all the way to their partner’s ﬁrst
estimate. Using this constraint, we assured that the amount of
change made in the second stage is solely due to observing the
partner’s choice and not because of a change of mind50. The three
partners differed in their susceptibility to taking inﬂuence from
the participant. In the baseline condition, the participant always
made the second estimate and the partner never contributed a
second estimate. Hence, participants were not able to observe the
susceptibility of the baseline partner. In the susceptible condition,
the partner was inﬂuenced strongly by the participant and revised
her initial estimate by conspicuously gravitating toward the
participant’s estimate. Vice versa, in the insusceptible condition,
the partner more or less ignored the participant’s opinion. The
partner’s initial estimate was generated identically in all three
conditions by sampling randomly from a distribution centered on
the correct answer.
We computed the inﬂuence that participants took from their
partner as the ratio of the angular displacement (in radians)
between their initial and ﬁnal estimate toward their partner’s
estimate divided by their initial angular distance from their
partner (Fig. 1b). Overall, participants were inﬂuenced by their
partners’ opinions (mean inﬂuence ± std. dev.= 0.36 ± 0.11;
Wilcoxon sign rank test vs zero, Z= 3.62, p= 0.0002). Consistent
with previous studies30,33,36, this indicates that our participants
did use social information (the partners’ choices) to improve their
decisions (mean ± std. dev. error after ﬁrst estimate 67 ± 7 radians
and after second estimate 64 ± 6 radians, Wilcoxon sign rank test,
Z= 3, p= 0.002). To test our main hypothesis, we asked whether
revised opinions were more inﬂuenced by the susceptible than
the insusceptible (Fig. 2a) and baseline (Fig. 2b) partners. The
difference between the average inﬂuence in the susceptible and
the insusceptible condition, which is a measure of reciprocity,
was signiﬁcantly larger than zero (Fig. 2a–c, Wilcoxon sign rank
test, Z= 3.33, p= 0.002 after Bonferroni correction). Similarly,
the inﬂuence from the susceptible partner was larger than the
inﬂuence in the baseline condition (Fig. 2b, c, Wilcoxon sign
rank test, Z= 2.34, p= 0.03 after Bonferroni correction). The
difference between insusceptible and baseline was not signiﬁcant
(Wilcoxon sign rank test, Z= 1.11, p= 0.26).
The three different partners’ initial estimates were produced
from an identical generative process using exactly the same
distribution and therefore ensuring that the partners’ accuracies
were perfectly controlled across conditions. However, one might
argue that the observed result may be due to the difference in
perceived accuracy of the partner. Indeed, we may think more
highly of those who conﬁrm our decisions more often and,
subsequently, take our (misguided) assessment of their compe-
tence as grounds for integrating their estimate into our own
revised opinion. To test this hypothesis directly, at the end of each
experiment, we asked the participants to rate the precision of
the partners they interacted within the experiment, how much
they liked different partners, and their own performance as well.
A mixed effect model showed that perceived precision of the
partners, the actual precision of the partners, the participants’
actual precision in different conditions, and the liking of the
partner did not have any effect on reciprocity (Supplementary
Note 1). The performance ratings of the partner did not differ
across conditions (Fig. 2d, repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA), F(2.49, 39)= 1.07, p= 0.36). In each trial, after
participants registered their estimates, they were required to
report their conﬁdence about their estimates using a scale from
1 to 6. Employing mixed effect models, we showed that condition
(baseline, susceptible, or insusceptible) had a signiﬁcant effect on
inﬂuence even if conﬁdence was included as a potential confound
(Supplementary Note 1).
At the end of the experiment, we asked participants to rate how
much they liked their three partners on a scale of 1–10. The mean
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Fig. 1 Experimental task. a Participants ﬁrst observed a series of dots on the screen. Participants were required to indicate where they saw the very ﬁrst dot
(yellow dot) and then declare their numerical conﬁdence. After making their individual estimates, they were presented with the estimate of a partner (red
dot) concerning the same stimulus. After observing the partner’s choice, in some trials the participants and in other trials the partner was given a second
chance to revise their initial estimate. Afterwards, they were brieﬂy presented with their initial choices and the second choice. In experiment 1, they did the
task with three different alleged human partners, which only varied in the second choice strategy in different blocks: in the baseline blocks, the participant
made all second choices. In the susceptible blocks, the partner was very inﬂuenced by the participant’s ﬁrst choice, however in the insusceptible blocks, the
partner was much less inﬂuenced by the participant’s ﬁrst choice compared to susceptible blocks. b Inﬂuence was computed as the angular displacement
toward the peer’s choice divided by their initial distance from each other’s choice
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score ± std. dev. was 7.64 ± 0.7 for the susceptible partner, 5.94 ±
2.53 for the insusceptible partner, and 7.52 ± 1.41 for the baseline
partner. Our data shows that people liked the susceptible partner
over the insusceptible one (Wilcoxon sign rank test, Z= 2.62,
p= 0.008). There was no difference between susceptible and
baseline partners (Wilcoxon sign rank test, Z=−0.34, p= 0.72)
and the p-value for the difference between the baseline and the
insusceptible partner was only around the threshold (Wilcoxon
sign rank test, Z=−1.91, p= 0.056).
Experiment 2A and 2B. The results of our ﬁrst experiment show
that human participants were more inﬂuenced by partners which
were reciprocally more inﬂuenced by the participants. We next
asked whether human participants change their advice-taking
strategy in response to a change in the advice-taking strategy of a
partner over time. To answer this question, we carried out
experiment 2A using the same paradigm as in experiment 1 but
with an important modiﬁcation. The participants were told that
they are working with the same partner during the entire
experiment. The partner’s strategy changed across time: in one
part of the experiment, the partner was susceptible, in the other
part, she was not. Between the two conditions of the experiment,
there was a smooth transition (from susceptible to insusceptible
or vice versa) and the order of the conditions was counter-
balanced across participants (Supplementary Figure 1).
We calculated participants’ trial-by-trial inﬂuence in the two
conditions. Replicating experiment 1, reciprocity, again deﬁned as
inﬂuence in the susceptible condition minus inﬂuence in the
insusceptible condition, was signiﬁcantly larger than zero (Fig. 3a,
Wilcoxon sign rank test, Z= 3.54, p= 0.0003). A mixed effect
model showed that condition (susceptible or insusceptible) had a
signiﬁcant effect on inﬂuence even if conﬁdence was included
as a potential confound (Supplementary Note 1). Again, using
a mixed effect model, we showed that the change of inﬂuence
across conditions cannot be explained by a change in perceived
performance of self or partner (Supplementary Note 1).
An interesting question is whether reciprocity is affected by the
condition (susceptible or insusceptible) with which the partici-
pant started the experiment. To answer this question, we
compared the reciprocity for participants who were ﬁrst exposed
to the susceptible partner to participants who started with
the insusceptible partner. Our result showed no difference in
reciprocity between these two groups (mean ± std. dev. for those
who started with reciprocal partner 0.049 ± 0.1 and for those
who started with non-reciprocal partner 0.08 ± 0.07, Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, z=−1.07, p= 0.28).
The present results demonstrate that if a participant observes
any change in the amount of inﬂuence she has over her partner,
she will in return modify the amount of advice she takes from her
partner. We, therefore, hypothesized that our participants exploit
reciprocity as a social signal to communicate with their partner.
We predicted that participants would not show reciprocity when
working with a computer. In other words, reciprocity depends
critically on whether we believe it changes the partner’s state of
mind. To test this prediction, we conducted experiment 2B in
which participants were told that they were working with a
computer. All other aspects of the experiment remained as in
experiment 2A. As predicted, we did not observe reciprocity
when participants believed they were working with a computer
(Fig. 3b–d, Wilcoxon sign rank test, Z=−1.57, p= 0.11). In fact,
a majority of participants showed the opposite pattern observed
in experiment 2A (Fig. 3b). A two-way ANOVA with factors
condition (susceptible or insusceptible as within subjects factor)
and type of partner (believed to be human or computer as
between subjects factor) and inﬂuence as the dependent variable
showed a signiﬁcant interaction of type of partner and condition
(F(1, 58)= 14.8, p= 0.00001). The effect of condition alone
was not signiﬁcant (F(1, 58)= 0.49, p= 0.51), but there was also
a signiﬁcant between-subject effect of type of partner (Fig. 3c,
F(1, 58)= 4.16, p= 0.04). A post hoc analysis between
reciprocity in human and computer condition conﬁrmed a
signiﬁcant difference in reciprocity between these two conditions
(Fig. 3c, d, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, Z= 2.97, p= 0.003).
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Fig. 2 Results of experiment 1. a Reciprocity, computed as inﬂuence in the susceptible condition minus inﬂuence in the insusceptible condition, plotted
across participants. b Reciprocity, computed as inﬂuence in the susceptible condition minus inﬂuence in the baseline condition, is plotted across
participants. c Average reciprocity across participants in insusceptible and baseline conditions compared to the susceptible condition. Error bars indicate
the standard errors and were computed across the participants’ average reciprocities. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.005; Wilcoxon sign rank test. d Performance
ratings for self and all partners as reported at the end of the experiment
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Taken together, these results demonstrate that participants
were more inﬂuenced when they thought their partner is a
computer (mean inﬂuence ± std. dev.: 42 ± 0.16) compared to
when they thought their partner is a human (mean inﬂuence ±
std. dev.: 0.34 ± 0.13).
We then investigated whether the distance between the
participants’ and the partners’ initial estimates affected
the inﬂuence that participants took from their partner or the
strength of reciprocity (see Supplementary Note 1 for details).
We did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of distance (mixed ANOVA,
F(2.6, 151)= 1.17, p= 0.31) nor signiﬁcant interactions between
distance and condition (mixed ANOVA, F(2.6,151)= 1.47,
p= 0.22) or between distance, condition, and experiment
(F(2.6, 151)= 1, p= 0.38). The interaction between distance
and experiment was only around the signiﬁcance threshold
(F(2.6, 151)= 2.7, p= 0.05). We also did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
effect of distance on reciprocity in experiment 2A (repeated
measures ANOVA, F(2.61, 75)= 1.63, p= 0.16). Taken together,
these results show that the distance between the initial estimates
did not affect the inﬂuence that participants took from their
partner nor the strength of reciprocity.
Finally, we asked how being in the susceptible and insuscep-
tible conditions changed the participants’ ratings of their own and
their partner’s performance. To answer this question, participants
were asked to rate their own and their partners’ performance on a
1–10 scale at the end of each condition, i.e., twice in each
experiment 2A and 2B. As there was not any difference in
performance rating between experiment 2A and 2B, neither for
self nor partner (Supplementary Figure 2), we aggregated the data
of the two experiments. Participants’ rating of their own
performance was signiﬁcantly lower in the insusceptible than
in the susceptible condition (Fig. 3e, Wilcoxon sign rank test,
Z= 3.04, p= 0.002), while participants’ rating of their partners’
performance remained unaffected by the partners’ susceptibility
(mean rating ± std. dev.: 6.63 ± 1.58 for susceptible condition, and
6.81 ± 1.59 for insusceptible condition; Wilcoxon sign rank test,
Z=−0.9, p= 0.36).
Discussion
An important question in human social interaction is how people
weigh others’ opinion51. Bayesian theories recommend that dif-
ferent opinions should be weighted by their reliability in order for
the group to beneﬁt from putting the opinions together52. Indeed,
some empirical evidence has supported this view9,30,32,33 while
others have shown other decision aggregation strategies in human
social interaction10,36.
We developed an experimental paradigm inspired by previous
work on social information aggregation10. We quantiﬁed
how people weighted their peer’s opinion in the context of a
visual perceptual task. We tested if this weighting depends on the
weight their peers assigned to the participants’ opinion. In
experiment 1, participants worked with three different alleged
human partners in separate blocks. Our participants were more
inﬂuenced by the susceptible partner compared to the baseline
and insusceptible partners. In experiment 2A, the behavior of a
single partner changed dynamically within the same experiment
from susceptible to insusceptible or vice versa. We replicated the
result of experiment 1 by showing that participants were more
inﬂuenced in the susceptible condition than in the insusceptible
condition. In experiment 2B, we showed that participants did not
reciprocate when their peer was a computer even though they
took greater inﬂuence from the computer’s advice.
When combining opinions in an optimal Bayesian way to
maximize accuracy, each source of information should be
weighted based on its reliability29. Consequently, reciprocity of
social inﬂuence, i.e., weighting others’ opinion by the weight they
give to our opinion is not consistent with Bayesian reliability-
based information aggregation. In our experiment, we system-
atically controlled the accuracy of the participants’ partners
a
0.2
0
–0.2
–0.4
0.4
0.2
0
–0.2
–0.4
0.4
Subjects N = 30
Subjects N = 30
b
R
ec
ip
ro
cit
y
R
ec
ip
ro
cit
y
0
–0.4
–0.8
0
–3
–2
–1
1
2
3
**
Subjects N = 60
e
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 ra
tin
g
in
su
sc
.-s
us
c.
Human
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08 Computer**
ns
–0.02
–0.04
–0.06
–0.08
R
ec
ip
ro
cit
y
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
c
Human Computer
dSusceptible
Insusceptible
In
flu
en
ce
Fig. 3 Results of experiments 2A and 2B. a Reciprocity when participants believe they interact with a human partner. b Reciprocity when participants
believe they interact with a computer partner. c Inﬂuence for alleged human and computer partners across susceptible and insusceptible conditions. Dots
indicate each participant. Black dots depict the mean inﬂuence across participants while error bars depict the standard error of the mean. d Average
reciprocity across participants when participants think they interact with a human or a computer partner. Error bars depict the standard errors. e Difference
in participants’ performance rating for self, insusceptible minus susceptible, plotted for each participant. The inset shows the mean and standard error
across participants. **p < 0.005, ns not signiﬁcant; Wilcoxon sign rank test
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such that they were identical across experimental conditions.
Participants rated their own performance lower in the insuscep-
tible condition than in the susceptible condition but did not
distinguish between the partners’ accuracies. With such judgment
of their performance and that of their partners, a hypothetical
Bayesian participant would have taken more inﬂuence from the
insusceptible partner. This is actually what participants did when
working with a computer partner. However, when working with a
human partner, they followed the opposite strategy and took
more inﬂuence from the susceptible partner.
Why do people go against an information integration strategy
that is more likely to maximize their accuracy? We propose that
reciprocity is a pervasive social norm48, and abiding by norms is
sometimes rewarding in itself and could hence become a goal53.
As a consequence, individuals may be ready to pay a cost (in
terms of reduced accuracy) to adhere to these norms54. This
explanation is supported by the ﬁnding that participants did not
reciprocate with a computer partner as participants did not
expect the computer to comply with the reciprocity norm.
In the susceptible condition, participants may reciprocate with
their reciprocating partners in order to keep their inﬂuence over
them and avoid the pain of being ignored47. As such, showing
reciprocity toward a susceptible partner may be driven by a form of
loss aversion. Why would people be aversive to losing inﬂuence?
Recent works have suggested that inﬂuence over others may be
inherently valuable both behaviorally55 and neurobiologically56.
There is now compelling evidence that others’ agreement with our
opinion is a strong driver of human brain’s reward network1,57. In
the insusceptible condition, on the other hand, ignoring the
insusceptible partner may be motivated by wishing to punish
someone who does not comply with the norm of reciprocity.
Following the norm of reciprocity might also improve people’s
self-efﬁcacy. It is possible that in the insusceptible condition players
perceive the experiment as a status competition. In this view,
ignoring the insusceptible partners in response to being ignored by
them could serve as a signal from the participant that she/he is
not willing to accept an inferior position58,59. Several studies in
behavioral economics (ultimatum game in particular) have shown
that one reason why people reject unfair offers is because they
want to send the signal that they will not be easily dominated and
thereby refuse to accept an inferior social status compared to their
peer60. Indeed, multiple studies have shown that people do not like
to be in an inferior position where their choices are less selected
than others’ and they use various strategies to compete with their
peers in having more inﬂuence56,61,62. However, people do not
engage in a status competition with a computer that is consistent
with the difference in reciprocity between human and computer
experiments (Fig. 3d). In addition to the above, ignoring the non-
reciprocating partner may also serve to protect the participant’s
“wounded pride”63 and maintain their self-esteem. Our ﬁnding
that participants rate their own performance higher when playing
with the susceptible than with the insusceptible partner (Fig. 3e)
is consistent with the hypothesis that having inﬂuence over others
improves self-efﬁcacy. It should be noted, however, that, there is
no one-to-one correspondence between the perception of self-
efﬁcacy and reciprocity: while the difference in self-efﬁcacy
between the susceptible and insusceptible conditions is the same
for experiment 2A and 2B (Supplementary Figure 2), the differ-
ence in inﬂuence is not: in experiment 2A, the inﬂuence in the
insusceptible condition is less than in the susceptible condition
but in experiment 2B, the inﬂuence in the susceptible condition is
identical to the insusceptible condition (Fig. 3c, d). Hence, reci-
procity cannot be entirely explained by changes in self-efﬁcacy.
Reciprocating inﬂuence is consistent with cognitive balance the-
ory64, which posits that humans change their preference to be
similar to those they like and dissimilar to those they do not.
In experiment 1, participants liked the susceptible partner
more than the insusceptible one and were more inﬂuenced by
the partner they liked more. However, in our experiment, the
participants were not allowed to change their estimate away from
their peers (participants were instructed to make their second
choice between their and their partner’s initial estimates). This
restriction makes it difﬁcult to directly address the relationship
between cognitive balance theory and reciprocity observed in
the current study.
In the insusceptible condition, participants’ perceived perfor-
mance of themselves dropped signiﬁcantly (Fig. 3e). Previous
studies show that humans are good at tracking their accuracy
even in the absence of any external feedback9,65. It is been argued
that people are able to get insight into their accuracy through past
experience66. However, in social contexts, their judgment could
be affected by the environment67 depending on whether they
compete or cooperate with a peer68. Our performance rating
results conﬁrm the effects of social context on human perfor-
mance monitoring. This ﬁnding shows that being ignored exerts a
devastating impact on self-efﬁcacy. One possibility is that being
repeatedly ignored in the insusceptible condition may induce a
negative emotional impression on the participant that impairs
the participant’s self-evaluation. Another possibility is that par-
ticipants may interpret the partner’s revised estimate as the cor-
rect position of the target. By deﬁnition, the insusceptible
partner’s revised estimates would fall further from those of
the participant. The inevitable conclusion for the ignored parti-
cipants would be that their opinion must have been less precise
in the insusceptible blocks. Future studies could investigate each
of these potential explanations.
Previously, we showed that when working together in a dyad36,
people tend to operate by an “equality bias” giving equal weight to
their own and their partner’s decision. Participants fulﬁlled this
goal either by adjusting the weight they assign to each other’s
opinions36 or by matching their conﬁdence to the conﬁdence of
the other people they worked with61. Hence, in both cases, people
mutually adapted to each other’s behavior when required to make
decisions together. Similarly, participants exhibited mutual
adaptation of social inﬂuence in the present study.
Our results imply that humans do not only consider others’
reliability to compute the weight that they assign to others’ opi-
nion, but instead they take into account other factors like reci-
procity as well. We conclude that reciprocity plays a signiﬁcant
role in human advice-taking and social inﬂuence, which violates
the optimal account of human information integration. Reci-
procity as a social norm helps people to fulﬁll objectives of social
interaction including maintaining a positive self-image.
Methods
Overview. A total of 80 healthy adult participants (39 females, mean age ± std.
dev.: 25 ± 2.9) participated in three experiments after having given written
informed consent. Each participant participated in only one of the experiments.
Participants were students at the University of Freiburg, Germany. The
experimental procedures were approved by the ethics committee of the University
of Freiburg. All experiments were performed using Psychophysics Toolbox69
implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks). The data were analyzed using MATLAB
and SPSS.
Experimental task 1. This experiment was designed to investigate whether par-
ticipants were more inﬂuenced by whom they inﬂuenced more. Participants ﬁrst
made a perceptual estimate about the location of a target on the screen. Afterwards,
they were presented with the estimate from their partner regarding the same
stimulus. This was followed by making a second choice about the location of
the target or observing a second choice of their partner.
In more detail, the experiment went on as follows: participants (N= 20,
9 females, mean age ± std. dev.: 25 ± 2.8) were presented with a sequence of
91 visual stimuli consisting of small circular Gaussian blobs (r= 5 mm) in
rapid serial visual presentation on the screen (resolution= 2560 × 1440 Dell
U2713HM 27″). The ﬁrst item was presented for 30 ms and every other stimulus
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was presented for 15 ms each. Participants’ task was to identify the location of the
ﬁrst stimulus. Participants were required to wait until the presentation of all stimuli
were ﬁnished, and then indicate the location of the target stimulus using the
computer mouse (Fig. 1). The reported location was marked by a yellow dot. After
participants reported their initial estimate, they were required to report their
conﬁdence about their estimate on a numerical scale from 1 (low conﬁdence) to 6
(high conﬁdence). Afterwards, participants were shown the choice of their partners
about the same stimulus (see below, Constructing partners section for further
details) by a small dot on the screen. Then, either the participant revised her
estimate or observed the partner revise theirs. After the second estimate was made,
all estimates were presented to the participant for 3 s. In this stage, the ﬁrst choice
was shown by a hexagon to be distinguished from the second choice, which was
shown by a circle (Fig. 1). There was not any time pressure on participants in any
stage of the experiment and the experiment did not move to next stage until the
participants had registered their responses (Fig. 1). Participants were told that their
payoff will be calculated based on their ﬁrst and second estimates. However,
everyone was given a ﬁxed amount at the end of the experiment.
During the course of the experiment, participants were exposed to three
different partners. Partners varied in their susceptibility to the participants’
estimates (i.e., the amount of inﬂuence the participants’ ﬁrst estimate has on the
partner’s second estimate). In the baseline blocks, the participant always made the
second estimate and the partner never contributed a second estimate. In the
susceptible and insusceptible blocks, the partner and the participants made the
second estimate in the odd and even trials, respectively. In the susceptible block,
the partner was inﬂuenced strongly by the participant and vice versa in the
insusceptible block (see below for details in the section “Constructing partners”). In
each block, the participants worked with only one partner and each block
contained 30 trials. Participants worked with each partner for ﬁve blocks. For
example, they worked with baseline partner in block 1, then with the susceptible
partner in block 2, then with insusceptible partner in block 3, then again with the
baseline partner in block 4, and so on. Participants completed 15 blocks in total.
The order of the partners was randomized across participants. The three partners
were shown by blue, red, and turquoise markers, which were randomly assigned to
the different partners at the beginning of each subject’s experiment. After ﬁnishing
the experiment, the participants were required to estimate their own and the three
partners’ performance on a numerical scale from 1 to 10. They were instructed to
only consider the ﬁrst choice to assess their partners’ performance. At the end, we
asked them whether they thought they interacted with real people or with a
computer algorithm. All participants indicated that they believed they were
interacting with real human partners.
Three participants were excluded from the ﬁnal analyses of this experiment.
One participant did not notice she played against three different partners. The
other two participants were excluded because they resampled in the second stage,
meaning that their second estimates were not between their own and their partner’s
initial estimates (contrary to the task instruction). In the Supplementary Figure 3,
we show that our ﬁndings remain valid and statistically signiﬁcant when these three
subjects were not excluded from the analysis.
Experimental task 2A. This experiment was designed to test whether reciprocity is
a dynamic process. The experiment used the same paradigm as experiment 1 but
participants (N= 30, 15 females, mean age ± std. dev.: 25 ± 2.8) were told that they
do the task with only one partner, which is the same gender as themselves. The
partner changed its susceptibility during the course of the experiment, either from
susceptible to insusceptible or vice versa. The experiment consisted of 11 blocks in
total. Half of the participants were ﬁrst probed in the susceptible condition, which
lasted ﬁve blocks and then with a transition block in between, they switched to ﬁve
insusceptible blocks. The other half completed the opposite order. The average
advice/inﬂuence that the partner took from our participants is depicted in Sup-
plementary Figure 1. The transition block was designed in order to avoid a sudden
change of the partner’s behavior. During the transition block, the partner’s advice-
taking strategy linearly (see below) switched from susceptible to insusceptible or
vice versa.
Debrieﬁng. After each session of the experiment, all participants were debriefed to
assess to what extent they believed the cover story. We interviewed them with
indirect questions about the cover story and all participants stated that they
believed they were working with other human participants in neighboring
experimental rooms.
Experimental task 2B. This experiment differed from experiment 2A in one
respect: participants (N= 30, 15 females, mean age ± std. dev.: 24 ± 3.1) were told
that their partner in the experiment is a computer. Any other aspects of the
experiment were identical to experiment 2A and they received exactly the same
task instructions as in experiment 2A except that the human partner was replaced
by a computer.
Performance rating. In experiment 1, participants rated their own and the three
different partners’ performance once at the end of the experiment. Note that a
different color identiﬁed each partner during the experiment. In experiment 2A
and 2B, participants rated their own and their partner’s performance at the end of
each block. This way, we obtained a pair of performance ratings for the self and the
susceptible partner and another pair for the self and the insusceptible partner.
Constructing partners. The error distribution of all partners’ ﬁrst choices was
modeled from participants’ actual estimation errors during a pilot experiment.
Ten participants performed an experiment identical to experiment 1 of the
current study. We aggregated errors of all participants (N= 10) and ﬁtted the
concentration parameter kappa of a von Mises distribution centered to the target,
yielding the value kappa= 7.4. Then, in each trial, we drew the ﬁrst choice of the
partner from this distribution. We speculated that participants’ assessment of their
partners’ performance may be strongly inﬂuenced by the few trials with high
conﬁdence (conﬁdence level of 5 or 6). To avoid this potential problem, the
partner’s ﬁrst choice was not taken from the von Mises distribution in high
conﬁdence trials but randomly drawn from a uniform distribution centered on the
participants’ choice with a width of ±20°.
The second choice of the partner was computed differently for susceptible and
insusceptible partners. For experiment 1, the inﬂuence that the insusceptible partner
took from the participants in each trial was chosen with a probability of 0.65 from a
uniform distribution on the interval [0, 0.2], with a probability of 0.2 randomly from
a uniform distribution on the interval [0.3, 0.7], and with a probability of 0.15
randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval [0.7, 0.9]. For experiment 2,
the inﬂuence that the insusceptible partner took from the participants was chosen
randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 0.2]. For the susceptible
partner, in all experiments, the inﬂuence was chosen with a probability of 0.5
randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval [0.7, 1], with a probability
of 0.2 randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval [0.3, 0.7], and with a
probability of 0.3 randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 0.3]. In
the transition block, the inﬂuence of the partner was a linear interpolation between
the susceptible and the insusceptible partner:
inf ¼ 1 λð Þ ´ infs þ λ ´ infins;
where infs and infins were the inﬂuences of the susceptible and insusceptible
partners, respectively (as explained above). λ gradually increased with time from
0 at the beginning to 1 at the end of the transition block for a transition from the
susceptible to the insusceptible condition. For the transition from the insusceptible
to the susceptible condition, λ decreased gradually from 1 to 0.
In experiment 1, on average, the advice that the partners took from the
participants was 0.3 and 0.55 in the insusceptible and susceptible conditions,
respectively. In experiment 2A, on average, the advice that the partner took
from the participants was 0.07 and 0.5 in the insusceptible and susceptible
conditions, respectively. The second choice of the partners in experiment 2B
was designed exactly the same as in experiment 2A and the average advice that
the partner took in the insusceptible and the susceptible condition was identical
to experiment 2A.
Computation of error bars. All error bars in the ﬁgures depict standard errors.
Standard errors were computed across subjects; in situations where we had
multiple measurements from each participant, we ﬁrst computed the mean
value for each participant, and then computed the standard error across the
participants’ mean.
Data availability. The behavioral data that support the ﬁndings of this study and
the code that was used to generate the ﬁndings and to conduct the experiments
of this study will be provided to all readers upon request.
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